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FROM VENGEANCE TO VENGEANCE:
SENTENCING REFORM AND THE DEMISE
OF REHABILITATION
Leonard Orland*
Within the past two years, a significant number of states have
abandoned indeterminate sentencing and parole in favor of determinate sentencing codes. These statutes, while varying in detail,
purport to move toward sentencing equality by establishing a system of determinate sentences which direct the sentencer to impose
a flat sentence on the basis of statutory aggravants and mitigants.
"Flat," "determinate," or "presumptive" sentencing codes have
been promulgated from Maine 1 to California, 2 in such states as Indiana, 3 Arizona, 4 Illinois, 5 and Minnesota. 6 Similar legislation is
pending in more than a dozen other state legislatures, 7 while still
* Visiting Scholar, Yale Law School, 1979. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A., 1957, Rutgers University; LL.B., 1960, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.

1. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251-1254 (West 1978). See generally
F. Hussey, J. Kramer, D. Katkin & S. Lagoy, The Anatomy of Law Reform: The
Effect of Criininal Code Revisions on Sentencing-The Maine Experience (Nov.
1976) (paper presented to American Society of Criminology).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). See generally Cassou
& Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California:The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC.
L.J. 5 (1978).
3. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1 to -6-6 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978). See generally L. Orland, The Future of Rehabilitation as a Rationale for Sentencing and
Imprisonment (Sept. 21, 1978) (paper for the Criminal Justice Colloquium, Indianapolis, Indiana, cosponsored by the Indiana Lawyers Commission, the Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar Association, and the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies).
4. See Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-101 to -121 (Special Supp. 1978).
5. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1 to -10-2 (Smith-Hurd Pamphlet
Supp. 1978).
6. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West). The
Minnesota legislation requires the sentencing commission to submit sentencing
guidelines to the legislature by January 1, 1980. Id. § 9(5).
7. See, e.g., Conn. Subst. H.B. 5987 (1978); Colo. H.B. 1589, 51st G.A., 2d Sess.
(1978). "Substantial legislative action has taken place on sentencing proposals in
Ohio, Alaska, Florida, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Washington and Tennessee. Legislatures
in Kansas, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina and Massachusetts are beginning to consider the issue. Substantial interest in the subject has been shown by officials in
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other states are making efforts to have parole boards become the
statutory vehicle for sentencing reform. 8 A Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act, featuring a presumptive sentencing matrix and a
sentencing commission, was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July, 1978. 9 In addition, the United States Senate, by an overwhelming vote, has
passed a comprehensive federal penal code which would establish a
system of flat guideline sentences to be promulgated by a sentencing commission. 10
How did this extraordinary effort at penal law reform come
about? What are its potential consequences?
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

It is difficult to dispute the historical truth that those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it. Therefore, it is essential
to evaluate the current sentencing reforms in their historical context.
Herbert Wechsler has observed that "[c]riminal law in the
United States began on independence with reception of the English common law, which in the eighteenth century was both a
Connecticut, Kentucky and the District of Columbia." Gettinger, Three States Adopt
Flat Time; Others Wary, CORREcTIONS MAGAZINE, Sept. 1977, at 16.
8. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 144.775-.790 (1977). The Oregon legislation directs an Advisory Commission on Prison Terms and Parole Standards to "propose to
the State Board of Parole and the board shall adopt rules establishing ranges of duration of imprisonment and variations from the ranges." Id. § 144.775(8).
9. Model Sentencing and Corrections Act (draft approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, July 28-August 4, 1978). The
author served as an advisor to the Special Committee on the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act.
10. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This Article deals with §§ 101 and 124
of the bill. Id. §§ 101, 124. Section 101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 18 of
the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sentencing guidelines. All subsequent
textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 18 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 18
U.S.C. Section 124 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the United States
Code to establish a Sentencing Commission. All subsequent textual and footnote references to § 124 of the bill are to proposed section numbers in Title 28 of the United
States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 28 U.S.C.
On the sentencing commission aspects of S. 1437, compare Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on the Proposed New Federal
Criminal Code, Special Report on the Provisions of S. 1437 (The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code) Relating to a U.S. Sentencing Commission (Mar. 21, 1978) with
M. Frankel, Sentencing Provisions of S. 1437 (Dec. 28, 1977) (remarks before
Criminal Law Section of Association of American Law Schools).
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crude and bloody system."" In the years following the American
Revolution, American criminal law did little more than fix penalties
for major crimes. 1 2 Before the Civil War, the criminal law was
composed of scattered piecemeal statutes which prescribed fixed
sentences for specific offenses. The primary justification for these
penalties was retribution. 13 Law reformers of the post-Civil War
era, inspired by Edward Livingston and David Dudley Field,
moved toward criminal law codification. At approximately the same
time, American prison reformers, influenced by penal efforts of
Maconochie in Australia and Crofton in Ireland, rejected retribution and enshrined rehabilitation as the prime goal of criminal
law. 14 The prison reformers generated a movement which led to
the widespread acceptance, between 1880 and 1920, of indeterminate sentencing with parole. By 1922, thirty-eight states had
enacted some form of limited indeterminate sentencing structure;
by the beginning of 1976, all states had adopted the indeterminacy
15
approach.
The movement toward comprehensive indeterminate penal
codes received substantial impetus from the Model Penal Code,
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1962. The Model Penal
Code groups all felonies into three categories. For each category,
the Code mandates legislatively established maxima and minima.
The judge then imposes an indeterminate sentence within these
statutory parameters. 1 6 Under the Model Penal Code, the parole
board, constrained only by the judicially imposed maxima and minima, decides when the inmate should be released.
In the decade from 1962 to 1972, United States penal law
underwent extensive and rapid revision. By 1974, twenty-one
states had enacted comprehensive, substantive penal codes based
on the Model Penal Code; twenty-six states were in the process of
penal code revision. Only three states had not planned substantive
7
criminal law revision.'
11. Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Criminal Law, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 419 (R. Hood ed. 1975).
12. Id.
13. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971); Rothman, If
Prison, How Much, in JUSTICE IN SENTENCING 46-52 (L. Orland & H. Tyler eds.
1974).
14. See L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS 29-33 (1975).

15. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS IN FOUR STATES 5 (1976).
16.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

17.

See Wechsler, supra note 11, at 418, 466-68.
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At the height of this substantive criminal law reform movement, a handful of books appeared which challenged the theoretical
underpinning of the Model Penal Code. The first, Struggle for Justice, 18 published by the American Friends Service Committee, was
a sensitive yet trenchant probing of the coercive treatment model
of parole. Shortly thereafter, Judge Marvin Frankel published
Criminal Sentences, an enormously influential attack on the irrationality of the current sentencing structure and sentencing disparity. 19 Judge Frankel called for the creation of a sentencing commission to curtail sentencing disparity and to create a basis for
20
informed, consistent sentencing principles.
These multiple themes-the evils of sentencing disparity, the
failure of coercive rehabilitation, the inability of parole boards to
predict, the desirability of eliminating parole and returning to
flat sentencing-were echoed in works by two influential reform
committees, the Committee for the Study of Incarceration, 2 1 and
22
the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing,
as well as in books by Fogel, 2 3 Wilson, 2 4 van den Haag, 2 5 Orland, 26 and Gaylin, 2 7 among others. 2s These works have produced
what is perceived by some legislators as a consensus of informed
opinion which can be distilled into the following propositions:
(1) Sentencing disparity is widespread and is to be condemned.
(2) Parole boards fail in their most important functions;
dangerousness cannot be predicted and rehabilitation cannot
be ascertained.
(3) Parole board inconsistency and unfairness, as well as sentencing disparity, are widespread and legitimate causes of inmate discontent.
18.

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

(1971).

19. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973).
20. Id. at 118.
21. For the committee's report, see A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
22. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
23. See D. FOGEL, ". . . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF..." (1975).

24. See J.Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
25. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975).
26.

See L. ORLAND, supra note 14.

27. See W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE (1974).
28. See, e.g., N. MoRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT

(1974); P. O'DON-

NELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIs, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING

SYSTEM (1977); A. Partridge & W. Eldridge, Second Circuit Sentencing Study, A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit, reprinted in Reform of the Federal Crimi-
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Superimposed on this consensus was a broader theme, present in
earlier literature, 29 but restated most emphatically by Robert Martinson: Rehabilitation, tested empirically, is a failure; "nothing
works" as a prison reform program to reduce recidivism.3 0
Since rehabilitation and the coercive rehabilitation model were
viewed as deficient, the philosophical approach of penal code reformers shifted from treatment to vengeance as the primary justification for incarceration. However, the new code word was "just desert,"31 rather than the theretofore discredited terms "punishment,"
"vengeance," or "retribution."
These skeptical reform books emerged in the midst of a national criminal law reform movement sparked not only by the
Model Penal Code, but also by the substantive and procedural reform efforts of the American Bar Association Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice, 3 2 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 3 and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. 34 In the
same period, an Attica Riot Commission Report 3 5 heightened the
nation's consciousness of the plight of prisoners, and the United
States Supreme Court produced an extraordinary series of decisions
36
which created a legal revolution in the field of prisoners' rights.

nal Laws: Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and
Proceduresof the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8101 (1974).
29. See, e.g., L. WILKINS, EVALUATIONS OF PENAL SENTENCES (1969); Bailey,
Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 153

(1966); Hood, Research on the Effectiveness of Punishment and Treatments, in 1
COLLECTED STUDIES IN C MINOLOGICAL RESEARCH 74 (1967). See generally L.
ORLAND, supra note 14, at 35-48.

30. See Martinson, What Works?--Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 22.
31. See N. MORRIS, supra note 28, at 60, 73-77. Morris defines "desert" as the
"retributive maximum," id. at 75, which sets "the maximum of punishment that the
community exacts from the criminal to express the severity of the injury his crime
inflicted on the community." Id. at 74.
32. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974).
33. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); PRESIDENT'S
COMNI'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967).
34. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS (1973).
35. NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA

(1972).

36. L. ORLAND, supra note 14, at 9-11. Among the revolutionary Supreme Court
decisions handed down in the decade beginning in the mid-1960's, see Wolff v.
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Sentencing reform thus was presented to state legislatures and
Congress as a rational and "liberal" solution to the widespread
shortcoming of the existing system of criminal punishment. Such
liberal stalwarts as the American Civil Liberties Union took a firm
position on the need to abandon indeterminacy in favor of determinate sentencing. The, ACLU Board adopted a policy statement
that declared that the ACLU "opposes indeterminate sentences"
and "also opposes confining people in prison or determining the
'3 7
duration of confinement for the purpose of rehabilitating them."
ACLU affiliates supported the abandonment of indeterminacy in a
3
number of states. 8
As a former critic of indeterminacy, 39 I must now express my
serious reservations about the abandonment of rehabilitation. These
reservations are based on an examination of the legislative provisions emerging from this sentencing reform effort. Of primary
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Lee v. Washington, 390
U.S. 333 (1968); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. American Civil Liberties Union National Board of Directors, Minutes 10
(Mar. 4-5, 1978).
38. For example, abolition of parole and reform of sentencing in Connecticut
received substantial impetus from the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union. See Sacks,
Promises, Performance, and Principles:An Empirical Study of Parole Decisionmaking in Connecticut, 9 CONN. L. REv. 347, 349-50 (1977). In Illinois, an ACLU
spokesperson told the legislature: "I advocate the discontinuance of indeterminate

sentencing in favor of fixed maximum terms to be imposed by the court at the time
of sentencing." Statement of Alvin J. Bronstein, Executive Director, National Prison
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, presented to the Adult
Corrections Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee of the Illinois General
Assembly (May 10, 1976) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review). Certainly,
Mr. Bronstein can find little satisfaction in legislative acceptance of the indeterminacy recommendation since the Illinois legislature has rejected his second suggestion: that the "fixed term should be relatively short, not to exceed two years in most
cases." Id. My own proposals suffered a similar fate. See note 39 infra.
39. For example, in Prisons: House of Darkness, I stated: "Indeterminate sentences and parole boards should be abolished." L. ORLAND, supra note 14, at 146.
Like the ACLU, I added a caveat: "These proposals are made with some disquietude, since I recognize the possibility that they could, by the vicissitudes of
legislative amendment or judicial construction, inadvertently lead to increased incarceration." Id. at 157 n.23. At that time, I was a member of the Connecticut Parole
Board and chairman of the Connecticut Department of Corrections Task Force to
Draft a Substantive and Procedural Discipline Code. The question of the relative
fairness of parole boards and prison discipline committees as determiners of time
served has emerged as a significant issue in new determinate sentencing jurisdictions. See notes 115-121 infra and accompanying text.
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concern are the clearly repressive features of the new determinate
sentencing codes. These codes present examples of how wellintentioned reform efforts can lead, almost perversely, to repressive and retrogressive legislation.
THE DEMISE OF REHABILITATION?

After examining "all available reports published in the English
language on attempts at rehabilitation that had been made in our
correction system and those of other countries from 1945 to
1967,"4o Professor Martinson and his associates suggested in 1974
that these studies led them irrevocably to the conclusion that nothing works and that those involved in the criminal justice system
41
had no idea how to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism.
However, in a later study, using more sophisticated research techniques and a wider data base "meant to improve upon the author's
previous work," Professor Martinson did find that the recidivism
rate had declined from the 1960's to the 1970's and that the recidivism rate for prisoners released on parole was lower than for
42
those discharged without parole supervision.
Both the original and the revised Martinson data have been
criticized for overstating their points. 4 3 But the original data certainly justified the conclusion that it is difficult to prove that prison
rehabilitation works. It by no means follows, however, that because
of failure of proof, the sentencing structures of the penal codes of
the United States should be completely revamped. Moreover, the
notion that the Model Penal Code was drafted on the naive assumption that putting people in prison would in fact rehabilitate
them may be an historical distortion. The American Law Institute
debates suggest some skepticism by the Model Penal Code drafters
and advisors concerning the probability that prison could achieve
coerced rehabilitation. 44 More importantly, the Model Penal
Code's philosophy of rehabilitation had beneficial effects on correctional practice. It created a climate that made new rehabilitative
40.

Martinson, supra note 30, at 49. See also D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J.

WVILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975).

41.

Martinson, supra note 30, at 49.

42.

R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, KNOWLEDGE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING:

A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1976).
43. See Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY
133 (1975).
44. See Meeting of the American Law Institute Group in Connection with
Model Penal Code (Dec. 21, 1956), reprinted in part in L. ORLAND, JUSTICE,
PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 85-88 (1973).
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programs possible and curbed the potential retributive impulses of
legislators and administrators.
It remains to be seen what effect a return to a retributive philosophy will have on correctional practice and administration. One
obvious problem concerns the attitudes of line officers. In the late
1960's, the Task Force on Corrections of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded
that custodial prison officers should not be considered simply personnel responsible for control and maintenance of prisoners: "[Custodial prison officers] may be the most influential persons in institutions simply by virtue of their numbers and their daily intimate
contact with offenders .... They can by their attitude and understanding, reinforce or destroy the effectiveness of almost any correctional program." 4 5 Similarly, the literature of penology suggests
that the "prison guard who commonly sees his role principally in
terms of control, discipline and punishment is faced with a complex
set of expectations centering around treatment operations ...
[Guards] 'must "use discretion" and somehow behave both custodially and therapeutically.' "46
The abandonment of rehabilitation and the return to a
punishment rationale may have profound effects on prison staff. It
can lead to the resurgence of custodial and punitive staff perspectives. More significantly, whatever positive impact the humanist,
rehabilitative treatment approach has had may be lost. If correctional officers are told that rehabilitation is not their goal, they may
not in fact have rehabilitation as their goal. If correctional officers
are told that their business is to punish, they may in fact punish.
The rhetoric of "just desert" may be translated into a punitive
mode of daily operation by line correctional personnel.
The abandonment of rehabilitation may also have an adverse
effect on recruitment of senior correctional personnel. It is
questionable whether a retributive correctional system can attract
humane, compassionate people as commissioners and wardens to
administer a regime established to punish. Why should commissioners or wardens take risks or spend money for such programs as
furlough and work or education release? Why should they make

45.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 96 (1967).
46. G. HAWKINS, THE PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 89 (1978) (quoting Cres-

sey, Limitations on Organizationand Treatment in the Modern Prison, in THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON 103 (1960)).
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Is there not a substantial risk that available rehabilitative programs
will diminish or disappear? Would not that danger be even greater
in jurisdictions which adopt the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws which guarantees inmates a statutory right not to be
47
rehabilitated, a right not to participate in treatment programs?
The intellectual rehabilitation of retribution may have additional unintended adverse consequences: The theoretical legitimization of retribution may reinforce the acceptability of arguments
made by Supreme Court Justices who assert that "retribution is a
sufficient justification for legal executions." 4 8 While Justice Marshall would hold that capital punishment is cruel and unusual
punishment because retribution is an impermissible legislative purpose, Justice Stewart has tendered retribution as a proper rationale
for the constitutionality of capital punishment.4 9 Those who press
so vigorously to revive retribution to curb the shortcomings of rehabilitative sentencing must now confront the unintended consequences. The new California Penal Code, which eliminates indeterminacy by declaring that "the purpose" of criminal sanctions "is
punishment," 50 also contains a broad capital punishment provision. 51 This illustrates how the new retributive jurisprudence can
and probably will provide the intellectual justification for renewed
legislative and judicial expansion of capital punishment.52
47. Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 4-126(a) (Draft for Approval to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, July 28-Aug. 4, 1978)
("A confined person has a protected interest to choose whether to participate in educational, rehabilitative, recreational, or other treatment programs").
48. See Gibbs, The Death Penalty, Retribution and Penal Policy, 69 J. ClM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 291 (1978).
49. When the Supreme Court struck down the capital punishment statutes of
Georgia and Texas in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Marshall's
concurring opinion noted that "the public's desire for retribution... is a goal which
the legislature cannot constitutionally pursue as its sole justification for capital
punishment." Id. at 363. But four years later, the opinion of Justice Stewart in Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), sustained Georgia's capital punishment statute and
declared that while " '[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law' . . . neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our respect
for the dignity of men." Id. at 183 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949)).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
51. Id. § 190.
52. Of course, even when rehabilitation formed the theoretical underpinning of
criminal law, it was not seen as a bar to the death penalty. See Justice Black's opinion in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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SENTENCING EQUALITY?

The most serious problem which emerges from the reassertion
of a retributive approach to criminal sentencing is the correlation
between the new sentencing codes and more severe statutory
punishment. Provisions in the new sentencing codes which prohibit
suspended sentences and authorize high maximum sentences present grave risks that these statutes will result in unwarranted and
significant increases in incarceration levels. 53 At the same time, it
is unlikely that the new legislation will achieve the principal objective of the reformers-sentencing equality. The current sentencing
legislation will not result in true sentencing equality. Rather, the
responsibility for inequality will be shifted from sentencing judges
and parole boards to prosecutors54 and prison administrators. 55
The Abandonment of Suspended Sentence and Probation
Both the Model Penal Code 56 and the ABA Standards 57 encourage suspended sentence as an alternative to imprisonment.
"The legislature," the ABA Standards declare, "should authorize
the sentencing court in every case to impose a sentence of probation. Exceptions to this principle are not favored and, if made,
'58
should be limited to the most serious offenses."
The new sentencing codes reject this wisdom. The Senatepassed revised Federal Criminal Code 5 9 prohibits probation for
specified drug offenses,6 0 as well as for certain offenses committed
while the defendant is armed.6 1 Arizona prohibits suspended sen62
tence and probation if the offender has a prior felony conviction,
uses a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,6 3 or knowingly inflicts serious physical injury.64 Illinois prohibits probation for all
53. See text accompanying notes 78-109 infra.
54. See text accompanying notes 110-114 infra.
55.
56.
57.
ING TO

See text accompanying notes 115-121 infra.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATPROBATION §§ 1.1-.2 (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA PRO-

BATION STANDARDS]; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2.3 (Ap-

proved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS].
58. ABA PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 57, § 1.1(a).
59. See note 10 supra.
60. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 1811(b).

61.

Id. § 1823(b).

62.
63.

ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(A) (West Special Supp. 1978).
Id. § 13-604(F).

64. Id.
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class X felonies, 6 5 specified narcotics violations, 6 6 and class 2
felonies committed by recidivists. 67 Maine prohibits suspended
sentence if the offender uses a firearm 68 or is a second offender
burglar. 69 Indiana prohibits probation for offenders with prior
felony convictions. 70 California's new determinate sentencing code
contains a special provision regarding use of firearms. The judge
may not grant probation or suspend sentence for offenders who use
firearms during the commission of murder, assault with intent to
commit murder, robbery, kidnapping, first degree burglary, rape,
72
and escape. 71 Probation is also proscribed for specified recidivists
and narcotic offenders. 73 California has thus eliminated probation
for a substantial number of serious felony offenders.
These unwarranted restrictions on judicial leniency must be
viewed as a punitive, law and order approach. The results are undesirable for reasons spelled out by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 74 by the
ABA Standards, 7 5 and by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.76 As the ABA Advisory
Committee explained in its commentary to the Probations
Standards:
[T]he basic reason underlying this view [that legislation should
not prohibit probation eligibility] is that offenders and offenses
are not fungible, that "[however right it may be to take the
gravest viev of an offense in general, there will be cases comprehended in the definition where the circumstances were so
unusual, or the mitigations so extreme, that a suspended sen65. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c) (Smith-Hurd Pamphlet Supp.
1978). Class X felonies include: Aggravated kidnapping, id. ch. 38, § 10-2(b)(1); rape,
id. ch. 38, § 11-1; deviate sexual assault, id. ch. 38, § 11-3; heinous battery, id. ch. 38,
§ 12-4.1; armed robbery, id. ch. 38, § 18-2; aggravated arson, id. ch. 38, § 20-1.1; and
treason, id. ch. 38, § 30-1.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(D)-(E).
Id. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(G).
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 1252(5) (Supp. 1978).
Id. § 1156.

70.
71.
72.
73.

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-2 (Bums Supp. 1975).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
Id. § 1203.08.
Id. § 1203.07.

74. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAwV ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 14-26 (1967).
75. See ABA PROBATION STANDARDS and ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra
note 57.

76.

NATIONAL

ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND

GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 141-96 (1973).
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tence or probation would be proper." MODEL PENAL CODE §

6.02 Comment at 13 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). In addition .. .
exclusions from probation eligibility have in practice been met
by the same avoidance techniques reserved for other types of
mandatory sentences, a practice which produces unnecessary distortions and introduces unnecessary seeds of disrespect for the
77
system.
Excessively High Maxima
Unfortunately, the new sentencing codes may result in a substantial increase in time actually served by prisoners. The authorized statutory maxima in all the new codes are excessively high.
Under the Senate-passed Federal Criminal Code, the au7 9 10
thorized maxima is life for A felons, 78 20 years for B felons,
years for C felons, 80 and 5 years for D felons. 8 1 Of course, it is
possible that the Sentencing Commission established by the Code
will create sentencing guidelines that mitigate the harshness of
these maxima. However, this likelihood is reduced by the Commission's statutory functions and responsibilities. While the bill requires the Commission to accomplish sentencing fairness and reduction of disparity, 82 it fails to direct the Commission to reserve
the upper level of maximum terms for exceptional cases. Moreover,
the bill sharply circumscribes the ability of the Commission to
promulgate guidelines which make the defendant eligible for early
release. 83

The authorized maximum sentences in the new state codes are
even more excessive than the proposed federal bill. These codes
create far greater risks of unwarranted harshness.
Arizona has the dubious honor of mandating the harshest
mandatory statutory maxima.8 4 First offenders are subject to some77. ABA PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 57, Commentary at 22. This point has
not been missed by prosecutors bent on coercive plea bargaining. See text accompanying notes 110-114 infra.
78. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 2301(b)(1).
79. Id. § 2301(b)(2).

80. Id. § 2301(b)(3).
81. Id. § 2301(b)(4).
82.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 10, §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(0.

83. Id. § 994(b)(2).
84. The Arizona legislature appears to realize that harsh sentences may require funding for massive expansion of prison facilities.
The new Arizona code specifies that the mandatory period of time to be
served before parole eligibility will not go into effect until two conditions
have been met: five thousand inmate spaces must be available by July 1,
1980; and money must have been appropriated for an additional five
thousand new spaces by July 1, 1981.
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what reasonable flat sentences: 7 years for class 2, 5 years for class
3, and 4 years for class 4 felonies. 8 5 However, the sentencer is
authorized to increase the sentences of class 4 or 5 felons by 25%
or decrease them by 50% based on the presence or absence of
statutory aggravants or mitigants.A6 For more serious felony
categories, the authorized increase jumps to 100%.87 Interestingly,
the shopping list of aggravants includes, in addition to the usual
factors such as inflicting serious physical injury88 or presence of an
accomplice, 8 9 "any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice." 90
These authorized Arizona sentences, which permit courts to
impose flat sentences of 14 years for class 2 and 10 years for class 3
felons, apply only to unarmed offenders without prior felony convictions who do not inflict harm. 9 1 If any aggravating factors are
present, a grotesque series of bewildering mandatory multiplier
sentences are triggered. The sentences of class 4 felons may be
doubled if the offender has a prior conviction, 9 2 while class 2 and 3
93
felons with one prior conviction may have their sentences tripled,
and those with two or more prior convictions may have their terms
quadrupled. 94 Similar harsh (and unrealistic) mandatory multipliers
apply to felonies which involve the "use or exhibition of a deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument" and to offenders who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly inflict serious physical injury upon
another. 9 5 For example, class 4 felons who meet either of these
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OKLAHOMA, SENTENCING: OKLAHOMA PENAL SYS-

30 (1978). On the cost of massive expansion of incarceration, see note 43 infra
and accompanying text.

TEM

85. ARiz.

REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-701 (West Special Supp. 1978). Examples of

class 2 felonies include second-degree murder, id. § 13-1104(B), first-degree burglary,
id. § 13-1508(B), and kidnapping, id. § 13-1304(B). Class 3 encompasses manslaugh-

ter, id. § 13-1103(B), second-degree burglary, id. 13-1507(B), and aggravated assault, id. § 13-1204(B). Negligent homicide is one example of a class 4 felony. Id. §
13-1102(B).
86. Id. § 13-702(A).
87. Id. § 13-702(B).
88. Id. § 13-702(D)(1).
89. Id. § 13-702(D)(4).
90. Id. § 13-702(D)(9). The same open-ended factor is included as a mitigant.
Id. § 13-702(E)(5).
91. Id. § 13-604(A).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 13-604(B). Offenders with prior convictions who commit class 2 or 3
felonies are eligible for probation, parole, or suspension of sentence only after at
least two-thirds of the sentence imposed by the court is served. Id. Similar restrictions are placed on all felony categories. See generally id. § 13-604.
94. Id.§ 13-604(D).
95. Id. § 13-604(F).
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criteria may have their sentences doubled. If the offender has a
prior felony conviction, the sentence must be doubled and may be
tripled. If he or she has two or more prior convictions, the prison
term must be tripled and may be quadrupled. 9 6
While Arizona's mandatory sentences are clearly the harshest
in the nation, other state statutes also authorize high maxima. Surprisingly, many establish a broad range of permissible terms. This
significantly reduces the potential for achieving sentencing uniformity. For example, the new Indiana maxima for major felonies
fall into five categories, each containing statutory aggravants and
mitigants. The authorized penalty for murder is death or a fixed
term of 40 years which may be aggravated by an increase of 20
years or mitigated by a decrease of 10 years. Thus, the sentence
range is 30 to 60 years; this is without regard to provisions for
habitual offenders or consecutive sentences. 9 7 For class A felonies,
the authorized fixed sentence is 30 years, permitting 20 years for
aggravation and 10 years in mitigation-an effective fixed sentencing range of 20 to 50 years. 98 Similarly, the actual sentencing range
for class B felonies is 6 to 20 years;9 9 and class C felons can be
sentenced from 2 to 8 years in prison.'100
The new Illinois legislation also establishes wide sentencing
ranges. For example, X classified felons may receive a fixed sentence of 6 to 30 years, 10 1 or a possible extended term of 30 to
60 years if specified aggravants are present. 10 2 Class I felons may
receive authorized sentences of 4 to 15 years, 10 3 with a permissible
extended term of 15 to 30 years.' 0 4 Class 2 felons may receive 3 to
7 years, 10 5 or an extended term of 7 to 14 years,' 0 6 while class 3
felons may be sentenced to 2 to 5 years,' 0 ' or an extended term of
08
5 to 10 years.1

96. Id. These multipliers also apply to class 2 or 3 felons. See id.
97. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3 (Bums
98. Id. § 35-50-2-4.

Cum.

§ 13-604(C).

Supp. 1978).

99. Id. § 35-50-2-5.
100. Id. § 35-50-2-6.
101. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Pamphlet Supp.

1978).
102. Id. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a)(2).

103. Id. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(4).
104. Id. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a)(3).

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.

38,
38,
38,
38,

§ 1005-8-1(a)(5).
§ 1005-8-2(a)(4).
§ 1005-8-1(a)(6).
§ 1005-8-2(a)(5).
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In contrast to the federal bill, which sharply limits the
guideline sentence range,10 9 the extremely broad (and harsh) sentencing ranges of the new state sentencing codes, coupled with the
expansive nature of the statutory aggravants and mitigants, make
the achievement of sentencing uniformity a nullity. The Illinois
sentencing ranges already described provide a useful example. The
effective range for X felons is 6 to 65 years, while a felon convicted
of a less serious class 1 offense may receive a term within the wide
range of 4 to 30 years. There is no reason to assume that all X
felons will serve more time than all or even most class 1 felons. In
fact, there is no reason to assume most X felons will serve more
time than most class 1 felons. Even among similarly situated X
offenders, there is no reason to assume that similar sentences will
be imposed.
The Impact of Plea Bargaining
These new sentencing statutes invite prosecutorial abuse, an
additional reason why the goal of sentencing equality will remain
unfullfilled. As Professor Zimring has reminded us:
The paradox of prosecutorial power under determinate sentencing is that exorcising discretion from two of the three discretionary agencies [legislative and judicial] in criminal sentencing does
not necessarily reduce either the role of discretion in sentence
determination or the total amount of sentence disparity ...
[N]o serious program to create a rule of law in determining punishment can ignore the pivotal role of the American prosecutor. " 0
In addition, Professor Alschuler's point remains unchallenged:
"[F]ixed and presumptive sentencing schemes . . . are unlikely to
achieve their objectives so long as they leave the prosecutor's
power to formulate charges and to bargain for guilty pleas unchecked."'
With such sentencing approaches, "the unchecked
discretion over sentencing that has apparently distinguished our nation from all others would .. . reside, not just predominantly, but
' 2
exclusively in the prosecutor's office.""
109. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 994(b)(1).
110. F. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime 12-13 (1977) (occasional papers from University of Chicago Law School).
111. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING-REFORM OR REGRESSION?

59, 59 (1978).

112. Id. at 71.
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None of the new codes address the problem that unbridled
prosecutorial discretion presents to uniform sentencing. In fact, the
new codes exacerbate the problem of inequality in prosecutorial
sentencing. These sentencing statutes, by accident or design, are
structured to maximize prosecutorial advantage in plea bargaining
since harsh mandatory sentences can be circumvented by substituting lesser included or attempt offenses. 113 Moreover, the prosecutorial power created by statutory special offender categories is
rendered even more ominous by virtue of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 114 The Court sustained the
constitutionality of a prosecutor's threats, during plea bargaining, to
prosecute the defendant as an habitual offender if he did not acquiesce in a guilty plea on a nonhabitual offender charge.
The Catch 22 of Good Time
The reform literature reflects concern that disparity in judicial
sentencing is further increased by parole boards, which cannot rationally determine when a defendant is rehabilitated. But the new
state sentencing codes raise the risk that the tyrannical arbitrariness of the parole board will be replaced by the tyranny of prison
discipline committees, which have power to grant or take away substantial periods of good time.
It has been asserted that the public is deceived by an indeterminate sentence/parole system because sentences imposed do
not correspond with time actually served. However, it is a mistake
to assume that the flat sentences of the new state sentencing codes
are less likely to deceive the public. In fact, the effect of the Illinois and Indiana sentencing schemes is to delegate power to
113.

See, e.g., T. Clear, J. Hewitt & R. Regoli, Discretion and the Determinate

Sentence: Its Distribution, Control and Effect on Time Served (Nov. 16-20, 1977)
(paper presented to the American Society of Criminology). The authors observed:
The Indiana Code has been described by many insiders as a "prosecutor's"
law. Much of the increased prosecutorial discretion is based in the substantive law. For example, a number of offenses are non-suspendable. But the
new penal code provides that any offense which can be charged may also be
charged as an "attempted" offense, which carries the same penalty (except
in the case of murder). The primary distinction is that all "attempted" offenses are suspendable. The new "attempt" clause has the dual effect of
giving the prosecutor flexibility to bargain while silently providing added
pressure on the defendent [sic] to bargain, since attempt is an offense whose
elements of proof are generally much less rigorous than the regular criminal
statutes.
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
114. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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prison disciplinary committees to cut time in half or to double it in
much the same way that parole boards extend or reduce time.
Moreover, legislation in states such as Indiana places no statutory
restraints on the grant or deprivation of good time. This is in sharp
contrast to the federal bill which limits good time loss to 10% of
5
sentence."1
Under the Indiana sentencing code, the prison committee initially assigns all inmates one day of credit for each day of imprisonment.116 However, the discipline hearing committee can reassign an inmate to receive only one day of good time credit for each
two days served i i 7 or to receive no credit."" There are no substantive standards for prison misconduct and the standard for reassignment is literally open ended. The potential pernicious consequences of prospective reassignment of credit time are intensified
by the commissioner of correction's broad discretion to take away
credit time for violation of any disciplinary rule. 1 9 The disparate
effect of Indiana's good time structure on time actually served by
inmates is substantial. Two inmates who receive a fixed flat sentence of 30 years may actually serve 15 or 30 years, depending
upon whether credit time is awarded by class assignment or taken
away by disciplinary committee action.
While Indiana's good time legislation is the most unfair in the
nation in its unlimited delegation of discretion to correctional
authorities, potential for abuse and unfairness inheres in any major
good time system which permits substantial cuts for prison misconduct. Illinois awards one day of good time for each day
served and establishes minimal procedural rules for allegations of
prison misconduct, but permits the loss of "one year of good conduct credit for any one infraction.' 20 The notion that sentencing code reform will lead to equality of time served in Indiana,
Illinois, or any other state employing determinate sentencing and a
major good time credit system is illusory. All that Indiana and Illinois have done is shift the locus of potential arbitrary power from
the parole board to the prison disciplinary committee.
This result can hardly be viewed with satisfaction. There is no
115.
116.

See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 3824(b).
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-6-3(a) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978).

117. Id. § 35-50-6-3(b).
118. Id. § 35-50-6-3(c).
119. Id. § 35-50-6-5.
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd Pamphlet Supp.
1978) (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

17

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
[Vol, 37i 29
Hofstra
Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1978], Art.

reason to assume that prison discipline committees are capable by
inclination, training, or education of acting more fairly than parole
boards. 1 21 Moreover, even if such committees were inclined to act
fairly, this goal is unattainable without substantive standards concerning what constitutes prison misconduct and the maximum
amount of good time which can be withdrawn for each offense.
This reality will create consternation among those civil libertarians
who proposed the abolition of parole in the first place. More important, it should spawn a host of new litigation in the 1980's much
like the prisoner's rights litigation of the 1970's. These new lawsuits could claim that the entire process of granting and taking
away good time violates due process because no substantive
standards of misconduct exist. Prisoners could also claim cruel and
unusual punishment when the sanction imposed is disproportionate
to the misconduct charged.
Sentencing Commissions as a Solution
The capability of a sentencing commission to solve problems of
sentencing harshness and inequality depends upon the underlying
structure of the criminal code and the precision with which the
legislature delegates and structures the responsibilities of the sentencing commission. In a state such as Illinois, with harsh and expansive sentencing ranges, 122 and the potential for unfairness and
disparity in good time administration, 2 3 the chances that a sentencing commission 12 4 will achieve sentencing equality is nil. Probabil125
ity of success increases somewhat in states such as Minnesota,'
121. I have had the benefit of extensive experience in Connecticut's prison system. While serving as a parole board member committed to the due process mandates of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), I also drafted a discipline code to
meet the due process requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and
trained state correctional officers to implement the code. If the choice for determining time served must be placed either with a discipline committee or a parole board,
the latter is, by any standard, the better choice.
122. See notes 101-108 supra and accompanying text.
123. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
124. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-1 (Smith-Hurd Pamphlet Supp. 1978),
establishes a Criminal Sentencing Commission, while id. ch. 38, § 1005-10-2(5), authorizes the commission to "develop standardized sentencing guidelines designed to
provide for greater uniformity in the imposition of criminal sentences."
125. Minnesota has established a sentencing commission, Act of Apr. 5, 1978,
ch. 723, § 9(1), 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West) (to be codified in MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 244.09(1) (West)), which is directed to formulate guidelines by January
1, 1980, id. § 9(12) (to be codified in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(12) (West)). The
guidelines are to establish "[the circumstances under which imprisonment of an offender is proper," id. § 9(5)(1) (to be codified in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(5)(1)
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which provides for vesting of good time.' 2 6
The structure of the Sentencing Commission contemplated in
the proposed Federal Criminal Code12 7 offers hope that this Commission could become a significant instrument for sentencing reform. Among the virtues of the sentencing provisions in the federal
bill are those sections which specify that a term of imprisonment
for the specific purpose of rehabilitation is generally inappropriate,' 2 8 that guidelines should assure that available capacities of
correctional facilities are not exceeded,' 29 that sentences of imprisonment are inappropriate for nonviolent first offenders,' 30 that consecutive sentences should be circumscribed,' 3 ' and that initial
guidelines should reflect the average sentences currently imposed
and the length of prison time actually served under these sentences.' 32 However, the proposed federal sentencing structure contemplates high maxima and does not direct either the sentencer or
the Commission to impose the lowest sentence possible. Therefore,
while attaining greater uniformity, S. 1437 creates the risk of generally higher sentences than under existing indeterminate systems.
While the high maxima presently authorized by the proposed
Federal Criminal Code could lead to harsh sentences, 133 that

(West)), and a "presumptive, fixed sentence for offenders for whom imprisonment is
proper," id. § 9(5)(2) (to be codified in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(5)(2) (West)).
126. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, § 9(1), 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West)
(to be codified in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(1) (West)).
127. See Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 10, §§ 991-998.
128. See id. § 9940).
129. Id. § 994(g).
130. Id. § 994(i).
131. Id. § 994(p).
132. Id. § 994(l). However, the Commission need not be guided by terms presently served if they do not "adequately reflect a basis for a sentencing range that is
consistent with the purpose of sentencing" outlined in the bill. Id.
133. The concerns that S. 1437 may lead to increased incarceration have been
summarized by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's Special Committee on the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code:
It seems clear that S. 1437 is likely to increase the frequency and length
of jail sentences. The maximum terms for the grades of offenses are lengthy
(Section 2301) and there are some offenses (drugs and weapons) for which a
two-year jail sentence is mandated (Section 1811 and 1823). There is a presumption against early release (Section 994(b) (2)). The sentencing Commission must assure substantial terms of incarceration for recidivists, professional criminals, and the managers of organized criminal activities (Section
994(h)). When a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, the guidelines must
specify a sentencing range whose maximum does not exceed its minimum
by more than twenty-five percent (Section 994(b) (1)).
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risk could be reduced and the bill could be made substantially
more just by relatively modest changes. Amendments should be
designed to reduce relatively high maxima,1 34 declare that maxima
are to be reserved for exceptional cases, 1 35 eliminate mandatory
This Committee cannot understand either the apparent presumption in
favor of imprisonment or the reason for the increasing-and in certain cases
mandating-of the frequency and length of jail sentences. The draftsmen of
S.1437 have not cited any data or study to support their approach. Moreover,
... we do not favor mandatory minimum sentences.
...[P]rior mandatory minimum sentences have been unevenly applied
and frequently evaded by both judges and prosecutors. Moreover, when
faced with such a sentence, defendants often have little choice but to insist
upon trials, seriously clogging the already overburdened courts.
A further source of irrationality is the listing of factors in Section 994 (h)
each of which will individually mandate a guideline requiring a substantial
term of imprisonment. For example, should a "substantial term of imprisonment" be imposed whenever a person derives a substantial part of his income from conduct which turns out to be criminal, even though it may not
have been at all clear that the conduct was, in fact, criminal at the time it
occurred? Similarly, should a substantial term be required where the defendant had virtually no income, but substantially all of it came from a series of
petty thefts? In the same vein, does it make sense to require the imposition
of a substantial term on the basis of a "history" of prior felony convictions
without attention to the nature of the convictions, how far in the past they
occurred, or other possibly relevant factors?
The Committee believes that a rational and fair system must be flexible
and must minimize the breach between the offender and society and that
the proposals contained in S.1437 will not achieve these objectives. Among
other things, we specifically oppose the bill's presumption against probation
The approach of increased incarceration is embodied in, if not established by, the concept of guidelines. Indeed, given the stated purposes of
the criminal law contained in Section 101(b), to wit, to deter, to protect the
public, and to assure just punishment, we doubt that there will be many
guidelines or policies which will suggest probation without a term of imprisonment.
Moreover, no method for the development or justification of the
guidelines is specified or required. Although the Sentencing Commission is
required to consider certain factors, it appears to us that many of these
suggested factors cannot be quantified.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on the Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code, Special Report on the Provisions of S. 1437 (The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code) Relating to a U.S. Sentencing Commission 4-6
(Mar. 21, 1978) (footnote omitted).
134. See Amendment A: Reduction of Maxima, in Proposed Amendments to the
Sentencing Provisions of S. 1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, APPENDIX,
p. 52 infra.
135. See Amendment B: Reserving Upper Range for Dangerous Offenders, in
Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Provisions of S. 1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, APPENDIX, p. 53 infra.
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minimum prison sentences, 1 36 and make parole a component of the
137
original sentence rather than an additional period to be served.
In addition, the Sentencing Commission's guidelines should require the sentencer to impose the least restrictive nonprison sanction or, if a prison sentence is to be imposed, the shortest appropriate sentence. 138 This last suggestion would incorporate Norval
Morris' "principle of parsimony" under which the sentencer should
impose the "least restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to
achieve defined social purposes."'13 9 These amendments would
permit the otherwise intelligently conceived Federal Sentencing
Commission to develop sorely needed sentencing principles without being fettered by an unrealistic and unnecessary mandate to
develop guidelines which may promote long prison sentences.
CONCLUSION

Mindful that reform suggestions appear to be inherently susceptible to repressive modification, and believing firmly in Professor Zimring's admonition that sentencing reform " 'is one area
where we have to proceed with extraordinary humility,' "140 1 offer
several modest generalizations:
(1) While it may be intellectually attractive, a sentencing code
which declares rehabilitation dead and perceives the purpose
of sentencing as punishment may undermine the effectiveness
of well-trained treatment staffs and sound treatment programs.
(2) Lower but disparate sentences are preferable to higher but
equal sentences.
(3) The new state sentencing codes that seek to create sentencing equality will probably not achieve this result. Rather,
there is a substantial likelihood that higher unequal sentences
will replace lower unequal sentences.
136. See Amendment C: Elimination of Mandatory Minima, in Proposed
Amendments to the Sentencing Provisions of S.1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, APPENDIX, pp. 53-54 infra.
137. See Amendment D: Parole Component of Sentences, in Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Provisions of S.1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,
APPENDL X, p. 55 infra.
138. See Amendment E: Minimization of Imprisonment Sentences, in Proposed
Amendments to the Sentencing Provisions of S.1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, APPENDIX, pp. 55-56 infra.

139. N. MoRRs, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT 59 (1974).
140.

Editor'sNotebook, in CORiECTIONS MAGAZINE, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting

Norval Morris).
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(4) Discretionary release of offenders by prison discipline
committees based on good time credit is as bad, if not worse,
than release by parole boards. There is every reason to believe
prison disciplinary committees will act at least as arbitrarily
and unfairly as parole boards.
(5) Under the new determinate sentencing structures, uncontrolled judicial sentencing discretion may well be replaced by
uncontrolled prosecutorial sentencing discretion due to prosecutors' power over the charging process and the prevalence of
plea bargained sentences. The result may be a "net increase in
the amount of capriciousness and disparity in the sentences
' 141

offenders serve. "

(6) Sentencing commissions, particularly as fashioned by the
proposed Federal Criminal Code, are a potentially attractive
solution to the problem of disparity. However, sentencing
commissions may increase incarceration levels unless the
maximum sentencing terms are reduced and commissions are
authorized to impose the least oppressive sentence.
A consequence of these new sentencing codes may also be to
14 2
substantially increase the prison population of the United States.
141. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (1978). Silberman's comment came within the context of the following observations:
As is true of proposals for mandatory minimum and flat-time sentencing,
presumptive sentencing would not reduce the total amount of discretion
now excercised in the system; it would simply shift the discretion now exercised by judges and parole boards to prosecutors-who already exercise
more discretionary power than anyone, with the possible exception of the
police. Since the offense for which offenders were convicted would largely
determine the sentence they received, prosecutors would become the sentencing authority through their control of the charging process.
The result is likely to be a net increase in the amount of capriciousness
and disparity in the sentences offenders serve. Under the present system,
discretion is diffused among three more or less autonomous groups of officials: prosecutors, judges, and parole board members. Diffusion creates a
certain untidiness that fastidious legal scholars find upsetting; but when
people's lives and liberties are at stake, untidiness may be preferable to an
antiseptically neat and conceptually clean sentencing system. In practice,
diffusion of discretion provides a leavening effect: judicial discretion frequently provides a check on abuse of prosecutorial power; parole board discretion serves to limit abuse of judicial power; and discretion in all three
agencies serves to temper the harshness that prosecutors, judges, and legislators feel compelled to show in making sentencing decisions.
Id. at 295-96 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
142. John P. Conrad has noted that in "Ohio, where our General Assembly has
been considering a flat-term bill, an analysis of its impact on the prison population
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But the federal courts have indicated that they will not tolerate
massive overcrowding or unsafe penal institutions. Hence, states
which adhere to unrealistic sentencing legislation may well have to
embark upon a massive prison construction program. This selfgenerated need to expand prison capacity may force concerned
Americans to face hard questions: Does the United States want
or need to double the prison population from 400,000 to 800,000?
Will American taxpayers be willing to pay for the inevitable and
enormous construction costs, presently estimated at $50,000 for
each new prison bed? 14 3 American prison sentences already exceed those of most other Western nations.- 44 Is it wise to embark
upon legislative reforms which may further strengthen the role
of the United States as the champion of lengthy prison confinement? 14 5 I think not.
The future of rehabilitation is as bright or as dismal today as it
was a decade or two decades ago. It would be a profound mistake
to attempt to legislate rehabilitation out of existence and to substitute a system of sentencing based upon vengeance, the consequences of which will be to substantially increase time served in
United States prisons.
indicates that four years after enactment the population will increase by 21 percent
.... Conrad, In My Opinion, CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE, supra note 7, at i.
143. In Connecticut, the current cost for the construction of a new prison bed is
approximately $50,000 and the maintenance cost for one prisoner for a year is $9,000.

See Sacks, supra note 38, at 408.
144. After reviewing comparative statistics, Judge Frankel concluded that "the
United States probably has the longest sentences by a wide margin of any industrialized nation." M. FRANKEL, supra note 19, at 58 (footnote omitted).
145. The contrast between sentencing reform approaches in the United States
and those recently proposed in England is particularly dramatic. England already has
substantially lower sentences than the United States and an established system of appellate review of sentences designed to reduce sentencing disparity. See Meador,
Appendix C: The Review of Criminal Sentences in England, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 94-160 (1968); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 151 (1973); ORLAND, supra note 14, at 112-13. See generally, D.A.
THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING (1970). Yet the English Advisory Council on
the Penal System has recently proposed a significant reduction in authorized
maximum sentences so as to make sentences "comparable with 90 per cent of the
sentences actually imposed by the Crown Court in the years 1974, 1975 and 1976."

Editor's preface, Sentences of Imprisonment, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 709, 709. The resultant reductions would be quite substantial: the maximum sentence for rape would
drop from life to 7 years, for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
from life to 5 years, for burglary or handling stolen goods from 14 to 3 years. See

Radzinowicz & Hood, A Dangerous Directionfor Sentencing Reform, 1978 CRIM. L.
REV. 713, 713.
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APPENDIX

Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Provisions
of S. 1437, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code
Amendment A
Reduction of Maxima.-The maxima specified in § 2301 of S. 1437
should be modified to reflect the original recommendations of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, see NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT:
A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3201 (1971) [hereinafter
referred to as PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE], as follows

(additions italicized, deletions struck):
§ 2301. Sentence of Imprisonment
(a) IN GENERAL.-A defendant who has been found guilty of an
offense may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
(b) AUTHORIZED MAXIMUM TERms.-The maximum term of
every sentence shall include a prison term and a parole term. The
authorized maximum terms of sen
ar :
(1) for a Class A felony, the durati n of the dfcendant's h-fc
o- any period ofn if
not more than 30 years, including a parole
term under § 2303;
(2) for a Class B felony, not more than twentyfifteen years,
including a parole term under § 2303;
(3) for a Class C felony, not more than ten seven years, including a parole term under § 2303;
(4) for a Class D felony, not more than 4ve three years,
including a parole term under § 2303;
(5) for a Class E felony, not more than twe one yearm and
six months;
(6) for a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year;
(7) for a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months;
(8) for a Class C misdemeanor, not more than thirty days;
(9) for an infraction, not more than five days.
(c) ELIGIBILITY FOR EARLY

ELEASE.-A term of imprisonment

in excess of one year may be imposed to be served in full or may be
imposed to be served subject to the defendant's eligibility for early
release during any portion of the term pursuant to the provision of
subchapter D of chapter 38. A term of imprisonment of one year or
less shall be imposed to be served in full, confinement during such
period of one year or less being authorized as a condition of probation by the provisions of section 2103(b)(11).
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Amendment B
Reserving Upper Range for Dangerous Offenders.-Section 2301 of S.
1437 should be modified by adding, as a new section (d), the following
provision (adopted from PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE,
supra):
(d) UPPER-RANGE IMPRISONMENT ONLY FOR DANGEROUS FELONS-The maximum term for a felony shall not be set at more than
20 years for a Class A felony, 10 years for a Class B felony, 5 years
for a Class C felony or 2 years for a Class D felony unless, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and character of the defendant as it relates to that offense, and the
relevant Sentencing Commission guidelines and policy statements,
the court is of the opinion that a term in excess of these limits is
required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.
Amendment C
Elimination of Mandatory Minima.-The following sections of S.
1437, which establishes mandatory prison sentences for drug and weapons
offenses should be modified as follows (deletions struck):
§ 1811. Trafficking in an Opiate
(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if he:
(1) manufactures or traffics in an opiate;
(2) creates or traffics in a counterfeit substance containing
an opiate;
(3) imports or exports an opiate, or possesses an opiate
aboard a vehicle arriving in or departing from the United States
or the customs territory of the United States; or
(4) manufactures or traffics in an opiate for import into the
United States.
(b) GRADInrG.-An offense described in this section is:
(1) a Class B felony if.
(A) the opiate veighs 100 grams or more;
(B) the offense consists of distributing the opiate to a
person who is less than eighteen years old and who is at
least five years younger than the defendant; or
(C) the offense is committed after the defendant had
been convicted of a felony under federal, state or foreign
law relating to an opiate, or while he was on release pending trial for an offense described in subsection (a);
(2) a Class C felony in any other case.
NtWithstanding the previsiens ef part H!I ef this title, the eourt may not
sentenee the defendant te prebatien but shall sentenee hima aftr ensid
eration of the faetors set fort in seetion 2003(a), to a term of impris*
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cictoncant, unloss tno court fnds mhat, At thc tmo ol- tno onense-tne
dofendant was loss than eightoon -yoars old; tho dofcndant's montal capaeity was significantly impairod, althugh the impairmont was nt suAast
eeonstituto a dofcnso to proesotion; the dofendant was under unusual-and
substantial duross, although not such duross as ,,ould constituto a defense
to pr-seouitoin or th do ndant was an acomplico whoso partieipation-i4n
1
the onns
rivoy
as
inoir.
§ 1823. Using a Weapon in the Course of a Crime
(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if, during and in
relation to the commission of a crime of violence, other than a misdemeanor that consists solely of damage to property and that does not
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, he:
(1) displays or otherwise uses a firearm or a destructive device;
(2) possesses a firearm or a destructive device; or
(3) displays or otherwise uses:
(A) a dangerous weapon other than a firearm or a destructive device; or
(B) an imitation of a firearm or a destructive device.
(b) GADNmG.-An offense described in this section is:
(1) a Class D felony in the circumstances set forth in subsection (a)(1);
(2) a Class E felony in the circumstances set forth in subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3).
.1

-

..

I

Notwithstanding tho provisions of part III of this title, if the--offens-i
..ommittcd in tho ciroumnstanco sot forth in subsoction (a)(!) or (a)M2r-the
eourt may no..t setee tho dofondant to probation but-shal sontonee
himf, aftr oonsidoration of the factors sotfort in secti-2OO0-e-a
ten of imprisonment of not l ss than twvo years for an offonso dosoribed
in subsotion (a)(!) or: on. yar for- an offcnso dosoribod in subseotion
(a)(2), without dosignating oligibility for carly reloaso during-at-least-the
first two years of the torm fe- an offenso d.sor.ibod in subsoction
(1)-r
at loast the first yoar of tho torm for an offcnso dos.ribod in subs tion
(a)(2), with tho sontonco to run consocuitivoly to any othor term of impr.Is
onment im',posed upon the defenda,1
unlessth.. .....
find Lt, t the
time of the o.ffens, the d,1frondant was loss than cightoon-yca-d--the
d.fndant's mental capacity was signifiantly impairod, although the im
p. int
was not suc h as to constitut a dofcnso te prsetiont-the-def Hondant wf.as undor unu.sual and substantial duross, although not-sueh
duross as would constittot a defcnso to proesctioin; the dofcndant-was-an
acoomplico whose partioipation in tho offenso was relativoly minor; or-the
defendant establishos by a propondoranco of tho ovidonco that ho commit
tod tho offenso based upon a good faith boliof that ho was acting to pr-otoot a prson or pr.prty from conduct constituting a felony, although-not
under suc.h oirum. .stanos
as would constitto a defenso to prosccuiton-
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Amendment D
Parole Component of Sentences.-Section 2303 of S. 1437 should be
modified as follows (additions italicized):
§ 2303. Parole Term and Contingent Imprisonment Term Included
in a Sentence of Imprisonment
A sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year automatically includes, in addition to the specified term of imprisonment a separate:
(a) term of parole, the incidents of which are governed by the
provisions of subchapter E of chapter 38; and
(b) contingent term of imprisonment of:
(1) ninety days in the case of a felony; or
(2) thirty days in the case of two or more misdemeanors;
that may, in the event of recommitment for violation of a condition of parole, be ordered to be served by a defendant who was
released pursuant to section 3824(a)(1), or, if the contingent term
of imprisonment is longer, by a defendant who was released
pursuant to section 3824(a)(2) in lieu of the term of the original
sentence minus the portion of the original sentence served in
confinement prior to the defendant's release, provided that
combined prison term, parole term and contingent term of imprisonment shall not exceed the maxima specified in § 2301.
Amendment E
Minimization of Imprisonment Sentences.-Section 994 of S. 1437
should be modified as follows (additions italicized, deletions struck):

§ 994. Duties of Commission
(f) The Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to
subsection (a)(1) and (e)(1), shall promote the purposes set forth in
section 991(b)(1), with particular attention to the requirements of
subsection 991(b)(1)(B) for providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities, recognition that
many prison sentences are significantly higher than are needed to
adequately protect the public, and the general principle that sentences should call for the minimum amount of custody or confinement
consistent with the protection of the public and the gravity of the
offense.
(g) The Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to
subsection (a)(1) and (e)(1), shall seek to satisfy the purposes of sentencing as set out of in section 101(b) of title 18, United States Code,
taking into account that a sentence not involving confinement is to be
preferred to a sentence involving partial or total confinement in the
absence of affirmative reasons to the contrary, and the nature and
capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services
available in order not only to assure that the most appropriate
facilities and services are utilized to fulfll the applicable purposes but
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also to assure that the available rated capacities of such facilities and
services will not be exceeded.
(h) The Commission shall assure that the guidelines will specify
a sentence to a substantial tcrm an upper range of imprisonment
under § 2301(d) only in a case in which the defendant:
(1) has a history of prior federal, state, or local felony convictions for offenses committed on different occasions;
(2) committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal
conduct from which he derived a substantial portion of his income;
(3) committed the offense in furtherance of a conspiracy with
three or more persons engaging in a pattern of racketeering
activity in which the defendant participated in a managerial or
supervisory capacity; or
(4) committed a crime of violence which constitutes a felony
while on release pending trial, sentence, or appeal from a federal, state or local felony for which he was ultimately convicted.
(i) The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the
general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in most cases, particularly those in which the defendant is a
first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious offense.
(j) The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the
inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
for the purpose of providing the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment,
other than in an exceptional case in which imprisonment appears to
be the sole means of achieving such purpose and in which the court
makes specific findings as to that fact.
(k) The Commission shall insure that the guidelines promulgated
pursuant to subsection (a)(1) and (e)(1) reflect the appropriateness of
imposing an incremental penalty for each offense in a case in which a
defendant is convicted of multiple offenses committed at different
times.
(1) The Commission in initially promulgating guidelines for particular categories of cases, shall not exceed, be guided by the average
scntcncc impecd in cases involving sentences to terms of imprisonment, the length of such terms actually served in such categories of
cases prior to the creation of the Commission and in ccs involving
sentences to terms of imnpriso m.ent, the length of su h term
servod, unless the Gemmissien detcmines that suh a length f term.
of- imprrznment dees net adequately reneet a hasts Ir a sente eng
range that is eensistent vvith the pttrpeses ef senteneirng deseribed in
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